Abstract: This article will outline and analyse the current stance of English criminal law regarding the transmission of HIV. The issues that surround consent, particularly in circumstances involving HIV, will be examined in conjunction with the defence of 'reasonable precautions' with a particular focus on condom use and antiretroviral therapy. Attention will be paid to the contribution of case law and the various circumstances which may fall within this realm in order to gain insight into the social and personal difficulties that the virus presents both infected and uninfected parties. The paternalistic nature of the current legal approach to HIV sufferers will be critiqued and finger-pointing at vulnerable infected parties will be analysed, with a view to exploring alternative possibilities which value dignity and equality over self-preservation.
A. INTRODUCTION
In English law, criminal prosecution is possible when an individual transmits HIV to another person through unprotected sexual intercourse. Cases deemed appropriate for prosecution will likely proceed under s 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 1 upon the presumption that the defendant has recklessly transmitted the virus to an unsuspecting victim.
However, if the victim has consented to sexual intercourse, with full knowledge of the defendant's HIV status, the defendant will be afforded the defence of consent and his 2 liability will be negated. At present, informed consent offers the only known defence to the sexual transmission of HIV, which places a heavy burden on carriers of the virus to disclose their status before engaging in intercourse. This paper argues that the duty to forewarn others is unnecessarily harsh, as it forces HIV sufferers either to abstain from sexual activity or to disclose their status to all potential partners. Consent to the risk of transmission should not be the only defence available. A defendant should not be answerable where he has taken reasonable precautions to reduce the risk of transmission, through the proper use of condoms, or where he has a low or undetectable viral load.
It seems inevitable that at some point a defendant will raise the issues of condom use and viral load. Nevertheless, until this happens, the common law cannot develop, and HIV carriers are left with great uncertainty. Rather than waiting for the courts to formulate additional defences to the criminal transmission of HIV, a statutory defence of reasonable precautions should be created that erases any doubts that the courts or HIV sufferers may have. 3 Though a defence is preferable, the use of reasonable precautions to negate the defendant's recklessness will also be discussed. This is a real reform possibility; in fact, a recent scoping paper by the Law Commission examines the legal effect of precautionary measures on a defendant's recklessness. 4 This article will begin with an overview of the current state of the law. The development of the consent defence will be outlined, and attempts to redefine the parameters of the defence will be discussed. The article will then turn to the proposed solution to the problem: a defence of reasonable precautions that would absolve the defendant of liability for non-disclosure where they had taken precautionary measures to substantially lower the risk to the victim. The use of precautionary measures to negate the defendant's recklessness will also be discussed.
B. CRIMINALISING NON-DISCLOSURE
At present, HIV sufferers are in a state of limbo, as the courts have not yet specified when a sufferer must disclose their status to a sexual partner before engaging in intercourse. 5 The contested cases that have arisen so far have not touched upon all of the issues that could bear on a defendant's liability. R v Dica 6 and R v Konzani 7 both involved defendants who had engaged in high-risk sexual activity 8 and, perhaps more importantly, who did not question the allegation that they had acted recklessly in doing so. 9 Understandably then, there was no discussion in either case of the nature of the risk taken or how reasonable that risk was. . 5 Note that a person cannot be liable in English law for merely exposing someone to the risk of infection with HIV. Therefore, any reference to liability for non-disclosure means only those cases where there has been actual transmission. 6 8 ie unprotected penetrative sexual intercourse. Dica (n 6) 11; Konzani (n 7) 3-4. 9 Dica (n 6) 11; Konzani (n 7) 3-4.
Consent by a sexual partner to run the risk of infection with HIV provides a defence, but in almost all circumstances, it appears that this requires disclosure by the HIV positive person of his status. Placing the duty to disclose on the defendant ignores situations where the victim might have learned of the risk of HIV transmission from a source other than the defendant, and ignores the risk inherent in certain relationships. The issues surrounding the defence of consent will be considered before the discussion turns to the idea of reasonable precautions as a defence to the transmission of HIV.
Consent in the courts: the doctrine as it relates to the transmission of HIV
Consent by a sexual partner to the risk of infection with HIV provides a defence to a charge of recklessly transmitting the virus. The issue first arose in Dica. In that case, the defendant had unprotected sexual intercourse with two different women who were subsequently diagnosed as being HIV positive. 10 At first instance, the trial judge ruled that the jury could convict the defendant even if he was able to show that the complainants were aware of his condition. 11 Judge Philpot considered himself bound by the decision of the House of Lords in R v Brown, which found that consent is not a defence to the infliction of actual bodily harm unless the case falls within one of the recognised exceptions. 12 Given that it was not possible to bring HIV transmission within any of those exceptions, Judge Philpot held that it was not possible, as a matter of law, to consent to the risk of infection with HIV.
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The Court of Appeal disagreed, recognising a fundamental difference between a deliberate harming and the deliberate taking of risks that result in harm. 14 The Court was clearly intent on highlighting the different motivations of the defendants in Brown and in
Dica.
In Brown, the parties indulged in serious violence solely for sexual gratification. 15 In Dica, the parties were not intent on any kind of self-harm through sexual intercourse, but were 'simply prepared, knowingly, to run the risk -not the certainty -of infection, as well as all the other risks inherent in and possible consequences of sexual intercourse, such as, and despite the most careful precautions, an unintended pregnancy'. 16 In other words, the Court understood that such risks have always existed and that to criminalise HIV transmission 10 Dica (n 6) 3-8. 11 
The defendant as discloser
Konzani has been noted for the emphasis it places on the behaviour of the defendant. 
Treating relationships equally
As explained above, the doctrine of consent is strictly applied in criminal transmission cases. 'given the long-term nature of the relationships, if the defendant concealed the truth about his condition from them, and therefore kept them in ignorance of it, there was no reason for them to think that they were running any risk of infection, and they were not consenting to it'.
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Such a reading would suggest that the Court is open to a distinction in the type of disclosure necessary based on the relationship between the parties.
Unfortunately, this suggestion was foreclosed by the decision in Konzani. 44 That judgment insisted on conscious and willing consent to the specific risk of infection with HIV made after disclosure by the defendant. Consequently, the indication is that consent will not be presumed where the relationship is of a casual nature. This is regrettable. Where the parties are engaged in a high-risk sexual exchange, courts should be more alert to the risks that the parties are taking, and relax their strict application of consent.
Concluding thoughts
Despite the courts' consideration of other factors, strict consent is the only currently recognised defence to the criminal transmission of HIV. 43 Dica (n 6) 39. 44 Konzani (n 7) 41-42. Munro argues that there could still be a lingering relevance to the nature of the relationships involved. In particular, she argues that it may have been influential on the court's reasoning in Konzani that the intercourse in question took place in the context of more than casual relationships and with women who might be thought to be more trusting of the defendant within those relationships (a 15 year old virgin, a woman the defendant met at bible class and a woman with a very ill son). See Munro (n 17) 121.
defendant must have disclosed his status and received in response an informed consent to the risk of infection with HIV. This translates as an almost absolute duty to forewarn.
Many would agree with this approach. Erin and Harris, staunch supporters of bodily integrity, take the unwavering stance that one has an absolute duty to inform all sexual partners of one's status. 45 Their claim is based on the high regard society has for personal autonomy and for informed consent, and on the logic that disclosing one's illness to a potential sexual partner is the surest means of allowing that partner to enter the relationship after having made an informed, autonomous choice as to whether to run the risk of infection. The Court of
Appeal made this same argument in Konzani:
If an individual who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus conceals this stark fact from his sexual partner, the principle of her personal autonomy is not enhanced if he is exculpated when he recklessly transmits the HIV virus to her through consensual sexual intercourse. On any view, the concealment of this fact from her almost inevitably means that she is deceived. Her consent is not properly informed, and she cannot give an informed consent to something of which she is ignorant.
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Though these are understandable concerns, the duty to disclose is too restrictive an approach. First, by placing the onus on the defendant to inform the victim, the victim is absolved of liability for their own sexual health. This approach ignores the conscious advertence to the risk by the complainant, and thus enforces the message that people do not need to be responsible for their own sexual health because it is the responsibility of those with serious sexual diseases to disclose their status. Insofar as meeting public health aims and maintenance of bodily integrity are concerned, it seems a far greater priority to insist on some notion of shared responsibility. Second, the duty to forewarn places a burden on the infected party. It ignores the stigma attached to those carrying the virus and assumes that it would be easy to forewarn a partner -potentially a loved one -who would end the relationship as a result. 47 Though it is morally preferable for an HIV sufferer to make a full disclosure, the law should reflect the difficulty inherent in disclosing one's status, and thus should not insist on absolute disclosure or total abstinence. By adopting such a harsh stance, the law is reinforcing the stigma attached to the disease and adding to the burden of its sufferers. 
C. A DEFENCE OF REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS
The previous sections have shown that the strictly applied defence of consent is too restrictive and fails to take into account factors like the victim's knowledge of the defendant's condition and the relationship between the partners. In addition to relaxing the definition of consent, two other measures could be taken. First, the defendant's use of reasonable precautions could be treated as negating his recklessness (an essential element of the charge). Second, the use of reasonable precautions could be treated as a complete defence to the defendant's liability.
'Reasonable precautions' means that the defendant endeavoured to minimise the risk of transmission through the use of condoms or having a low viral load. As these measures can reduce the risk significantly, there would no longer be a need for disclosure.
Some commentators have proposed that another reasonable precaution be recognised:
the type of sexual activity. 49 According to these scholars, certain types of sexual activity are lower risk, and a defendant's conscious effort to engage only in those activities should be recognised as the equivalent of condom use or a low viral load. Although the likelihood of transmission may be diminished, choosing to engage only in certain sexual activities does not provide the same benefits to the victim as condom use. Condoms are widely available and, short of abstaining, are the best known means of preventing infection. Moreover, part of the allure of a reasonable precautions defence is that it encourages individuals with HIV to use condoms consistently and others to insist on the use of these. This has obvious public health benefits that the sexual activity argument does not. For all of these reasons, type of sexual activity as a reasonable precaution will not be discussed. Instead, the authors will outline the current legal effect of the reasonable precautions of condom use and low viral load in the UK, and will then explore them as a way to negate recklessness, and as a defence. Understandably, many of the reasons that support a negation of recklessness will also support a defence, and vice versa. Therefore, the discussion of the defence will focus more on why a defence is preferable to a negation of recklessness, and what that statutory defence could look like. 
The legal position in the UK

Negation of recklessness a) A justifiable risk
Recklessness is the minimum mens rea required to impose liability for the criminal transmission of HIV. 59 To prove recklessness, the prosecutor must show that the defendant took an unjustified risk. 60 Therefore, recklessness will be negated if the risk taken is considered justifiable. According to Ryan, the factors used to determine whether a risk is are taken, the risk of contracting HIV ought to be deemed too low for liability to attach.
As for a defendant's viral load, this is the greatest risk factor for HIV transmission.
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The higher a person's viral load, the higher the chance they will pass on the infection. This makes it a definite risk factor. However, precautions can be taken. A sufferer's viral load can be lowered by taking antiretroviral medications, and the consistent use of these treatments can lower a person's viral load to a level where it will no longer be detectable. 68 In fact, the The effect of these comments was mixed. Some courts endorsed them wholeheartedly, 78 whereas others were indifferent to them, and paid no attention to the accused's use of precautions. 79 As a result, the legal effect of condom use in Canada was uncertain for several years.
Around the same time, the Canadian courts were dealing with the legal effect of a low viral load. In R v DC, 80 the court found that a defendant with an undetectable viral load was not required to disclose their status to a partner because the level of risk of harm was not significant enough. 81 Though that decision was limited to those with undetectable levels, other cases suggested that a significant risk of harm could not be proved with a low viral load either. 82 It seemed that Canadian courts were indicating that viral loads, on their own, would be important to any assessment of risk.
R v Mabior
83 resolved any uncertainties around the legal effect of condom use or viral loads. It stated that the risk of harm could be reduced by the defendant's proper use of condoms, but only where the accused's viral load was also very low or undetectable.
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Therefore, under the Canadian approach a defendant must now use a condom and have a low viral load. This is despite the fact that the statistical probability of transmission where there is a low viral load or the use of protective measures reveals that the two can operate in isolation.
However, these cases still show that a precedent for recognising the use of precautions as 75 [1998] 2 SCR 371 (SC lowering the level of risk exists, and show how statistics on transmission may eventually sway the courts in the UK.
Ultimately, any discussion of whether the courts would recognise reasonable precautions as negating mens rea is purely speculative. Though the authors feel that the factors affecting the justifiability of risk are more than met, it cannot be denied that the courts may feel differently. They may continue to promote public health by punishing the sexual activity of HIV sufferers, or they may choose to reward the efforts of those sufferers, and acknowledge the difficulties that they face.
A Statutory defence
The authors have argued that the best way forward is the creation of a defence of reasonable precautions. This is true for a number of reasons, particularly because of the clear lines that it will provide to defendants and to the courts, and because of the public health benefits it will inspire. Recognising reasonable precautions as a defence, as opposed to as a negation of recklessness, would more clearly convey to sufferers the scope of their legal duty to others.
With suitable education, sufferers would know that taking reasonable precautions would afford them a defence to a charge of recklessly transmitting the virus. If the development of precautionary measures as negating recklessness were left to the courts, not only would it take a long time to develop, but it would likely be an uncertain development. This piecemeal approach is visible in the case development in Canada. In the period leading up to Mabior, uncertainty over the legal effect of reasonable precautions prevailed. This uncertainty should be avoided, as recognising reasonable precautions is meant to leave suffers in no doubt as to their legal obligations to others.
Similarly, the creation of a defence would remove any of the courts' uncertainties. A recognised defence would negate the need for the courts to consider conflicting statistics on the exact level of risk where condoms have been used, and whether this lowers the risk enough to negate a finding of recklessness. With a recognised defence, the decision would already have been made by the legislature. Canadian jurisprudence highlights this difficulty.
As regards viral loads, the courts first indicated that an undetectable viral load would eliminate the need for full disclosure by the defendant. The courts later indicated that a merely low viral load would be sufficient. In Mabior, the Supreme Court seemed to turn its back on these rulings, stating that a defendant would have to use a condom and have a low or undetectable viral load. The clarity that a statutory defence would provide would also assure sufferers of the legal benefits of careful condom use. This should encourage greater condom use amongst sufferers, which would in turn further public health aims. Aside from total abstinence, the use of condoms is the best way to prevent the spread of HIV and other sexually transmissible diseases. 86 On this note, the practicalities of adopting such a stance ought to be explored.
What would this statute look like? In the main, it would merely need to stipulate that careful condom use or a low viral load could be used as a defence; the burden would be an evidential one. It should also state that the defendant must take the (reduced) risk with awareness; that is, he must be aware of the effect of his taking precautions. Regarding viral load, the statute should specifically require that the defendant be able to establish a low viral load, by medical evidence, throughout the period of time during which he was engaging in intercourse with his partner. A defence enshrined in statute may, after medical advancements, become full of omissions or caveats. For this reason, a mechanism should be included in the legislation that allows it to be updated in an effective and timely manner. One way to accomplish this would be to allow the Secretary of State to enact new legislation as new circumstances arise. 87 For example, the law may someday want to recognise the type of sexual activity as a reasonable precaution that merits a defence, or there could be further advancements in antiretroviral therapies.
In terms of whether the defence would operate as an excuse or as a justification, the authors contend that no justification should be found. It is clear that a defendant's actions cannot be called justified when he has deliberately concealed his status as an HIV sufferer from his sexual partner. Fletcher captures the distinction nicely:
[C]laims of justification concede that the definition of the offence is satisfied, but challenge whether the act is wrongful; claims of excuse concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution of the act to the actor. A justification speaks as to rightness of an act; an excuse as to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful act.
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Justification therefore provides a much stronger form of exculpation. In Hart's words, a justification is given to conduct that 'the law does not condemn or even welcomes'. 
A duty to disclose?
What would become of the duty to disclose one's status if reasonable precautions negated recklessness or operated as a defence? It has been inferred that the need for disclosure would be negated by the defendant's taking precautions. Some extended discussion of this question is required, since it is at least arguable that whenever a risk, even a small risk, remains when reasonable precautions are used, the infected party ought still to have informed his sexual partner of his status. 94 Support for this stance is easy to find. There is a wealth of opinion questioning the morality of a stance that would allow infected parties to decide, on behalf of their sexual partner, the level of risk they are ultimately willing to accept. Ciccarone and others argue strongly that such an approach would be "ethically indefensible". 95 There is also the more serious fear that disclosure could turn violent if it results in a physical altercation. Given the potential gravity of these outcomes, it is clear that a decision as to the need for disclosure cannot be made in a vacuum. There needs to be a balancing of the difficulty of disclosure against the necessity for this where the risk has been substantially lowered by the defendant's use of precautions. It seems that Grant has the right approach when she says that the criminal law should be reserved for the most egregious cases of nondisclosure in the context of unprotected sex. 99 Disclosure is inherently difficult and those taking reasonable precautions are making efforts to avoid transmission of the virus.
The argument for disclosure despite precautions becomes even weaker when one considers the statistical probability of transmission when such measures are taken. For example, the Canadian AIDS Society considers unprotected anal and vaginal intercourse to be 'high risk behaviours' in terms of the likelihood of transmission, whereas it considers protected intercourse to be only 'low risk'. 100 Furthermore, the risk of transmission of HIV between heterosexual couples is reduced by up to 96% where the infected party is taking antiretroviral drugs.
In view of the low risk of infection where precautions are utilised, Bennett, Draper and Frith's argument that 'when the risk is low it is possible to act in a responsible and morally justifiable way without forewarning' seems more plausible. 101 They go on to argue that in a liberal society, the level of risk must surely be allowed to influence the obligation to forewarn others. 102 This is directed specifically at comments made by Erin and Harris, who advocate for an absolute duty to forewarn, largely on the basis of the (faulty) logic that all sexual relations with an infected party involve an absolute risk because HIV will eventually result in premature death. 103 Such an argument ignores science, 104 and ignores the actual behaviour of HIV sufferers. One study reveals that non-disclosure is often a considered choice where the risk is low, made where the sufferer is satisfied that as a result of that low risk, they are either not putting anyone at risk or are exposing them to a negligible risk only. 105 Two issues remain before the issue of disclosure can be laid to rest. The first is the failure rate of condoms. Condoms have been reported as having a 20% failure rate, in light of the fact that they can fall off, break, or be used improperly. 106 The question then becomes which party should bear the risk of the condom failing. 107 One approach is to insist on disclosure so that the person at greatest risk can decide exactly what risks they are prepared to accept. 108 The other is to accept the failure rate of condoms and to continue insisting on their use on the basis that, barring abstinence, condom use is the best known way to prevent HIV transmission. 109 The authors favour the latter approach, given that the taking of precautions should, in principle, be easier than disclosure, and that this contributes towards the overall aim of preventing the spread of HIV. 110 This strikes the appropriate balance that Ryan speaks of between the need to protect a sexual partner from exposure and the need to protect the person infected from the potentially negative consequences of disclosure.
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The second issue is whether allowing a defendant's recklessness to be negated or excused will lead to greater recklessness in society as a whole. Wilson and others argue that 'the risk of HIV transmission in heterosexual partnerships in the presence of effective treatment is low but non-zero and … if the claim of non-infectiousness in effectively treated patients was widely accepted, and condom use subsequently declined, then there is the potential for substantial increases in HIV incidence'. 112 Unfortunately, some sufferers with a low viral load will probably be of the opinion that they no longer need to utilise condoms if a low load is enough to avoid criminal liability. 113 However, the level of risk presented by such a person will be low enough that an increase in transmissions will be unlikely. Furthermore, even though those with low viral loads may not feel that they need to use condoms to protect others because of the low risk, they would likely do so in order to protect themselves from other STIs that could, in turn, cause their viral load to change.
It is true that a risk will always be present when a person engages in sexual activities with an HIV sufferer. But there is always a risk to sex -if not of contracting HIV, then of contracting another disease, or of becoming pregnant. 114 When a person with HIV takes reasonable precautions, the law should recognise that the sufferer has taken action to prevent the spread of the virus, and not punish them. An approach which places a higher degree of emphasis upon education and personal responsibility for one's own body may prove more effective in improving the wellbeing of both the sufferer and the uninfected party than one which focuses on penalisation.
D. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the transmission of HIV is a serious issue, and that it should be handled in a fair and sensitive manner. The authors suggest that the most appropriate way to achieve this aim is the implementation of a model that places an equal level of responsibility on both the infected and the uninfected parties. Currently, a disproportionate duty is placed on the infected party to forewarn any potential sexual partners of their HIV status. The authors submit that there is a significant difference between sexual encounters with nearstrangers and sexual encounters that occur within committed, monogamous relationships. The reduction of the duty to forewarn where no significant relationship exists could prove effective in increasing awareness of the virus and may, in turn, encourage people to take a higher degree of responsibility for their bodies. It is, however, recognised that a simple reduction of the sufferer's duty to disclose may not, in itself, prove effective enough in reducing the criminal liability of the HIV sufferer. It is suggested that the defence of reasonable precautions outlined within this article would likely allow for a wider margin of flexibility where the disclosure of HIV is concerned. Providing that a defendant has taken reasonable precautions to prevent the spread of the virus, they arguably ought to be entitled to an excuse in the rare circumstances where the virus spreads in spite of preventative measures that have been taken. An approach of this nature would provide clear guidelines for HIV sufferers, reducing the inequitable risk of criminalisation based on infection alone. Above all, it is submitted by the authors that the proposals outlined in this piece would be highly effective in reducing the stigma of HIV and in changing social attitudes for the better regarding transmission of the virus.
